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RESUMEN 
Nuestro trabajo construye un modelo simple para evaluar, por primera vez, los pros y 
contras relativos de los subsidios estatales al pago inicial (DS) y a la tasa de interés 
(IRS) sobre el acceso y la estabilidad del mercado hipotecario. El análisis revela varias 
lecciones de política relevantes para el diseño de estos programas, entre ellas: (a) Para 
generar neutralidad fiscal (igual gasto público), el IRS debe ser mucho más amplio que 
el DS en términos porcentuales; (b) A diferencia del DS, el IRS aumenta el tamaño del 
préstamo que el banco está dispuesto a conceder; (c) El DS es superior al IRS a la hora 
de focalizar en las familias de menores ingresos; (d) El DS puede elevar la 
probabilidad de default debido a esa focalización, mientras que el IRS  puede elevarla 
debido al mayor apalancamiento del deudor; y (e) Comparado con el IRS, el DS 
promueve una competencia menos agresiva en el mercado inmobiliario. 
Clasificación JEL: G21, G28 
Palabras clave: Subsidios hipotecarios, focalización de subsidios, subsidios del 
gobierno, mercado de hipotecas bancario.  
 
ABSTRACT 
Our paper sets up a simple model to assess, for the first time, the relative pros and cons 
of housing downpayment (DS) and interest rate (IRS) subsidies on the access to and 
the stability of the mortgage market. Our analysis unveils a number of relevant policy 
lessons for the design of housing subsidy programs, among them: (a) For fiscal 
neutrality (same government outlay) to hold, the percentage IRS must be larger than 
the DS; (b) The IRS raises the loan size a bank is willing to grant, but the DS; (c) 
When targeting lower income households, the DS is superior to the interest rate 
subsidy; (d) The DS may increase the probability of default due to this focalization, 
while the IRS may have the same effect via the increased borrower leverage; and (e) 
Compared to the IRS, the DS promotes a less aggressive competition in the real estate 
market. 
JEL Classification: G21, G28 
Keywords: Mortgage subsidies, subsidy focalization, government subsidies, bank 
mortgage market. 
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COMPARING DOWNPAYMENT AND INTEREST RATE 
MORTGAGE SUBSIDIES: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH* 
 
RICARDO BEBCZUK AND EDGARDO DEMAESTRI* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Economic and social reasons justify the apparent concern of governments 
around the globe to support access to housing. In the Latin American context, 
two subsidy alternatives that have gained increasing momentum are the 
Chilean-style downpayment subsidy and the Colombian interest rate subsidy. 
Details on design, implementation and outcomes are provided in Alarcon, 
Demaestri and Piedrabuena (2013) and Bebczuk and Demaestri (2014). 
As with any subsidy, the flip side is the potentially deleterious impact on 
the fiscal budget and on the allocation and quality of bank loan portfolios. 
Disappointingly, despite these latent vulnerabilities, there exists a conspicuous 
lack of analytical work in this area. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, 
no research whatsoever has tackled the relative pros and cons of both types of 
subsidy from a fiscal, banking and real estate market perspective. Such 
analysis should be of utmost interest for countries running or planning on 
putting in place a housing subsidy program. 
To fill this void, this article presents a model of banking intermediation 
centered around subsidized mortgage loans.1 As customary in the banking 
literature, the model will rely on financial frictions stemming from asymmetric 
information (see Bebczuk, 2003). In particular, attention will be paid to 
borrower’s moral hazard and the corresponding bank response with and 
without subsidies. Despite its simplicity, the model is well-suited to lay out the 
main features and explore the fiscal and financial implications of 
downpayment and interest rate subsidies.   
                                                          
* We acknowledge the valuable suggestions of two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
* Ricardo Bebczuk: Universidad Nacional de La Plata, ricardo.bebczuk@gmail.com. Edgardo 
Demaestri: Inter-American Development Bank. 
1 Despite the lack of theoretical developments, some conceptual and empirical work is available. 
A comprehensive review of housing policies can be found in Chiquier and Lea (2009). In turn, 
Ergungor (2011) empirically compares interest rate and downpayment subsidies in the US. 
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The paper has three sections, devoted to setting up the model 
foundations (Section II) and to exploring the impact on mortgage loan size 
and risk (Section III) and on home prices (Section IV). Some conclusions 
and policy lessons close.  
 
II. Model Setup 
 
In what follows we spell out the details of the model, which just intends 
be a stylized representation about the behavior of banks and borrowers in 
the presence of mortgage subsidies. Loan contracts take place in two 
periods, one in which the bank selects the borrower and disburses the 
funds, and a second and final in which the loan is due and is either repaid or 
defaulted. There are two possible states of nature: in the successful 
scenario, with probability αs, the borrower obtains an income high enough 
to repay, while in the case of failure, occurring with probability αf, the 
borrower’s income is assumed to be nil. Three equations are the backbone 
of the model, namely, the bank’s participation constraint (henceforth, 
BPC), the borrower’s ability to repay condition (BARC) and the borrower’s 
willingness to repay condition (BWRC).  
The BPC displays the break-even point beyond which the bank decides 
to stop lending, that is, ceases to willingly participate in the contract:  
 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐷𝑒𝑝 + 𝑔 ≤ 𝛼𝑠[1 + (1 − 𝑠𝑖)𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃]𝑃𝑃 + 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝑓(𝑉1 − 𝐸)              (1) 
 
According to equation (1), the bank aims to achieve an expected income 
greater or equal to the expenses involved in the intermediation process. The 
left-hand side highlights two costs: the cost of loanable funds –equal to the 
volume of deposits (Dep) times the gross required return on such deposits 
(1+r)- and other lending-related expenses, labeled as g. The right-hand 
side, in turn, describes the expected income sources. In the good scenario, 
the bank gets principal and interest in full, whereas in the negative scenario, 
the bank recovers part of the money owed, by liquidating the property in 
period 1 at an expected market value V1 net of mortgage foreclosure 
expenses E (covering legal and administrative outlays and the opportunity 
costs for judicial delays).   
Expected loan-related revenues comprise the payment made directly by 
the borrower as well as the interest rate subsidy, equal to the total interest 
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payment due (the loan P times the loan interest rate rp). A few assumptions are 
implicit in the analysis: (i) While there is a borrower risk, the subsidy is paid 
to the bank with certainty; (ii) To avoid the trivial case of a risk-free loan, the 
net revenue from repossession is lower than the total outstanding debt, which 
means in turn that the loan interest rate will always be above the deposit 
interest rate; (iii) The bank is risk neutral, which means that expected values 
are taken as certain. Perfect competition will happen when equation (1) 
becomes an equality; and (iv) No other costs or revenues enter the bank’s 
income statement. Though some of these assumptions are more realistic than 
others, none of them is critical for our conclusions and are adopted only for the 
purpose of simplifying the presentation. 
The value of the property being purchased in the first period, V0, is linked 
to the loan value P by the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝑃 =  𝑉0(1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠)                                       (2) 
 
where ds and dns  are, respectively, the subsidized and non-subsidized 
fractions of total downpayment in terms of V0. The expression (1 - ds - dns), or 
P/ V0, represents the initial loan-to-value, or LTV.  
For equation (1) to be fulfilled, two conditions must be met as well. For 
one, the borrower must receive in the good state an income high enough that, 
in conjunction to the government subsidy, covers the amount due. Thus, 
borrowers will be able to repay when:  
 
𝜃𝑌1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ≥ �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑝�𝑃𝑃                                  (3) 
 
The coefficient θ is the maximum percentage of period 1’s income allowed 
by regulation or the own bank’s policy to be applied to loan repayment.  The 
second and last condition is that, provided he/she is able, the borrower is 
willing to repay. For this incentive compatibility constraint to be satisfied, it is 
required that the cost of declaring default (the loss of the house with value V1 
in period 1) be higher than or equal to the benefit of repudiating the debt 
(economizing on principal and interest): 
 
𝑉1 ≥ [1 + (1 − 𝑠𝑖)𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃]𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉0𝑑𝑛𝑠 − 𝐵𝐵        (4) 
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Two additional factors may help defuse this moral hazard behavior. 
First, the decision hinges on the borrower’s initial self-financed investment 
sunk in the property in the form of downpayment (V0 × dns), as this sum will 
be lost upon the default event. Secondly, there might be a cost C associated 
to default, manifesting itself in a credit downgrade, the costs of relocation, 
and the psychological stress from failing to meet the moral obligation 
towards the creditor. It is worth noting that the downpayment subsidy (V0 × 
ds), despite improving the ability to repay, does nothing in relation to the 
willingness to repay, as it is not borrower’s money at stake. 
 
III. The Impact of Subsidies on Loan Size and Risk 
 
This section will examine how these two subsidies affect the maximum 
loan size a borrower can take on and the default risk for these subsidized 
mortgages. Before proceeding, it is useful to solve for the loan interest rate 
rp in the bank’s participation constraint (BPC, equation (1’)), the borrower’s 
ability to repay condition (BARC, equation (3’)) and the borrower’s 
willingness to repay condition (BWRC, equation (4’)): 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 ≥
(1+𝑟)𝑃𝑃+𝑔−𝛼𝑠𝑃𝑃−𝛼𝑓(𝑉1−𝐸)[𝛼𝑠+𝑠𝑖(1−𝛼𝑠)]𝑃𝑃                 (1’) 
 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 ≤
𝜃𝑌1+𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑖−1)        (3’) 
 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 ≤
𝑉1+𝑉0𝑑𝑛𝑠+𝐶−𝑃𝑃(1−𝑠𝑖)𝑃𝑃       (4’) 
 
In the plane (P, rp), the BPC function displays a non-linear, positive 
slope, as for a larger loan balance and a given net liquidation value (V1-E), 
the loan interest rate must rise so as to reach in expected value the 
minimum depositors’ required return (r). For the BARC function the 
relationship is negative because, for a given borrower’s income, a larger 
loan must be offset with a lower interest rate in order to maintain the ability 
to repay. Similar consideration explains the negative slope of the BWRC 
 COMPARING DOWNPAYMENT AND INTEREST … 37 
 
function: for a given V1, the incentive to default on the debt would increase 
unless the interest rate falls.  
Graphs 1-4 below depict the above functions under four possible 
configurations. A mortgage contract will be written as long as the three 
conditions are simultaneously met, a situation that will take place whenever rp 
lies on or above the BPC function and on or below the BARC and the BWRC 
functions. In Graph 1, no loan is made since no interest rate jointly satisfies the 
above conditions. The opposite is observed in Graph 2, where there is no 
maximum loan amount. These two cases are of course trivial and irrelevant in 
light of the questions at hand.  
Of greater interest is the case presented in Graph 3, where the ability to 
repay becomes a binding constraint and defines an upper loan limit, denoted as 
Pmax, barc. From equating (1’) and (3’), after some algebra we obtain:  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑐 = � 1−𝑠𝑖1+𝑟(1−𝑠𝑖)� �−𝑔 + 𝛼𝑓(𝑉1 − 𝐸) + �𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑖(1−𝑠𝑖)� 𝜃𝑌1�    (5) 
 
The willingness to repay is the binding constraint in Graph 4, with the 
following equation defining the maximum loan size:  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑏𝑤𝑟𝑐 = 11+𝑟 �−𝑔 + 𝛼𝑓(𝑉1 − 𝐸) + (𝑉1 + 𝑉0𝑑𝑛𝑠 + 𝐵𝐵) [𝛼𝑠+𝑠𝑖(1−𝛼𝑠)](1−𝑠𝑖) �  (6) 
 
As expected, in both equations (5) and (6) the maximum loan size grows 
with V1 and diminishes with g and E. Y1 exerts a positive impact in equation 
(5), as does C and dns in equation (6).  
More importantly, the interest rate subsidy si, by improving both the ability 
and the willingness to repay, favors a higher loan level. Conversely, the 
downpayment subsidy at rate ds has no incidence on the amount lent. This may 
look odd in view of the facilitating role a subsidy is supposed to play, but it 
must be recalled that this sort of subsidy, rather than operating through the 
banking system, embodies a transfer to the house seller.  In fact, a larger 
subsidy implies, via equation (2), a smaller loan for a given V0 –or, 
alternatively, a larger V0 for a given P.  This point can be made even clearer by 
looking at the extreme case in which si=ds=100%. If si=100%, the borrower is 
responsible for repaying only the principal, while the interest is covered (with 
probability 1) by the government, all of this induces the bank to offer a larger 
38 ECONOMICA  
loan. On the other hand, if ds=100%, then there would be no loan at all, as 
the borrower can now manage without bank financing. 
Naturally, the very same argument also explains the absence of ds in 
equations (5) and (6). The parameter dns appears in equation (6) solely 
through its effect as a commitment device on the willingness to repay. One 
possible pitfall of the downpayment subsidy would then be the strategic 
substitution between ds and dns: if opportunistic households with capacity to 
save and make a downpayment hide these funds to take full advantage of 
the subsidy, their incentive to repay will weaken. Proper ex ante screening 
is needed to discourage such behavior by thoroughly checking the actual 
applicant’s income and wealth. 
Going back to the positive effect of the interest rate subsidy on loan 
size, this may be read as good or not-so-good news depending on the 
circumstances. For house buyers without capacity to pledge downpayment, 
a bigger loan can certainly be a solution. However, higher indebtedness 
turns borrowers more vulnerable to negative shocks and thus a default 
scenario, a risk that intensifies during economic downturns. Along similar 
lines, since any feasible solution will lie along the positively-slopping BPC 
function, larger loans are accompanied by a higher interest rate, which 
heightens the above-mentioned risk. 
 
Graph 1. 
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Graph 3. 
 
 
Graph 4. 
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In spite of this differential effect on loan size, the model underscores the 
fact that both subsidies promote a higher financial inclusion by turning eligible 
for a loan some applicants that would have been otherwise rejected, should 
they depend exclusively on their own resources. To see this point, let us insert 
equation (2) into equations (3) and (4) to get:  
 
𝑌1 ≥
1
𝜃
��1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑝� − 𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃�𝑉0(1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠)                           (7) 
 
𝑉1 ≥ [1 + (1 − 𝑠𝑖)𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃]𝑉0(1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠) − 𝑉0𝑑𝑛𝑠 − 𝐵𝐵   (8) 
 
All else equal, higher values of si  and ds go hand-in-hand with an enhanced 
ability and willingness to repay. Equations (7) and (8) reinforce the claim that 
the downpayment subsidy fosters mortgage penetration by reducing, for a 
given V0, the loan amount and thus the prospective debt burden for the 
borrower. From the bank’s participation constraint (equation (1)), this is also 
associated to a lower mortgage interest rate. 
To perform a more strict comparison between subsidies, it is sensible to 
assume fiscal neutrality, that is, that the total outlays are the same under either 
scheme. In present value, the fiscal cost for the downpayment subsidy [FC 
(ds)] and for the interest rate subsidy [FC (si)] equal: 
 
FC (ds) = ds × V0                                                                           (9) 
 
FC (si) = (si × rp × P)/(1+r) = [si × rp × (1- ds – dns)  × V0]/(1+r)   (10) 
 
Equating both expressions, we obtain the interest rate equivalent subsidy 
(si,eq) with the same fiscal cost in present value as a given downpayment 
subsidy: 
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑒𝑞  = 𝑑𝑠 (1+𝑟)(1−𝑑𝑠−𝑑𝑛𝑠)𝑟𝑝                                          (11) 
 
For the same percentage subsidy (ds= si), the downpayment subsidy is more 
expensive from a budgetary standpoint. For example, if rp = 15%, dns = 0% and 
ds = 10%, assuming r=0, then si,eq = 74%. Intuitively, this follows from the fact 
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that the downpayment subsidy finances the principal, which usually 
exceeds the interest component, even more so in a two-period model such 
as the present one. 
A key lesson here is that, under fiscal neutrality, the choice of one 
subsidy regime or the other is immaterial in regard to the ability to repay, as 
for construction both subsidies will strengthen it to the same extent, in one 
case by liberating the borrower from part of the interest payments and in 
the other by cutting down the required indebtedness –see equation (7). The 
same goes, as apparent from equation (8), for the willingness to repay, 
provided the borrower puts up the same downpayment of his/her own (dns × 
V0).   
More profound differences can be pinpointed, though, in terms of 
focalization once we introduce certain typical eligibility requirements 
imposed by banks and regulators, as well as some usual design features of 
mortgage subsidy programs. In turn, such differences are likely to affect the 
average quality of the mortgage loan portfolio, as shown next. 
The first feature to factor in is that banks make credit decisions not only 
based on expectations of future variables but primarily on observable 
variables that are thought to be good predictors of payment behavior. Two 
crucial indicators in this regard are the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the 
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, which are formalized in equations (12) and 
(13):2      
                       
𝐿𝑇𝑉 = 𝑃𝑃
𝑉0
= 𝑉0(1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠)
𝑉0
= (1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠) ≤ 𝐿𝑇𝑉�����                    (12) 
              
𝐷𝑇𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃
𝑌0
= 𝑉0(1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠)
𝑌0
= 𝑉0
𝑌0
(1 − 𝑑𝑠 − 𝑑𝑛𝑠) ≤ 𝐷𝑇𝐼�����                 (13)   
 
As shown in the equations, by regulation or their internal credit policies, 
banks set maximum cutoff values for both parameters, 𝐿𝑇𝑉����� and 𝐷𝑇𝐼�����.  
For its part, housing programs, in line with their social and redistributive 
goals, tend to adopt eligibility rules biased towards poor and middle income 
families. Popular clauses are that beneficiaries must not have an income 
                                                          
2 Notice that these equations include the observable variables V0 and Y0, not the future values V1 
and Y1.  
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above a stated limit (equation (14)) and that the percentage subsidy must 
decrease with the property value (equation (15) and (16)): 
 
𝑌0 ≤ 𝑌�0                            (14)    
 
𝑑𝑠 = 𝑧(𝑉0)        (15)
         
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑦(𝑉0)        (16) 
  
with z(.) and y(.) ranging between [0, 1] and z’<0 and y’<0. 
Now a major difference arises between both subsidies, as the downpayment 
subsidy diminishes both the LTV and DTI ratios (see equations (12) and (13)), 
but the interest rate subsidy affects neither of them. This is so because the 
latter alleviates the financial burden once the loan has been granted while the 
former shrinks in advance both ratios by reducing the need for debt at the time 
of applying for the loan.  
Since lower income family have a limited capacity to save and hence 
accumulate enough wealth to provide the downpayment by themselves, the 
downpayment subsidy is especially critical for this population segment. By 
capping the income level to be admitted to the program (equation (14)) and 
setting a subsidy decreasing in property value (equations (15) and (16)), these 
subsidies reinforce their progressive effect. Still, the interest rate subsidy may 
fall short of reaching out to some poorer families unable to make the 
downpayment, so the government support may not be sufficient for these 
borrowers to qualify in the eyes of the bank.  
Targeting low and middle income customers is likely to have some impact 
on the quality of the mortgage loan portfolio. This clientele has a priori a 
higher probability of default –the parameter αf in equation (1)-, owing to their 
higher risk of unemployment (especially among less skilled and informal 
workers) and, in the case of small entrepreneurs, their limited capital and 
product diversification, which turn them particularly vulnerable to negative 
shocks. Compounding this problem, a lower probability of success implies a 
higher interest rate (via equation (1)), leading to a heavier future financial 
burden that compromises even further, as a second round effect, the ability and 
willingness to repay. As evident from this discussion, a trade-off between loan 
delinquency and income distribution equity may ensue.  
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IV. Housing Subsidies and Home Prices 
 
In assisting households to buy a house, subsidy schemes may fuel the 
demand and thus inflate the market price for residential real estate.3 By 
how much prices change depends on several factors: (a) The volume of 
additional demand made possible by the program; (b) The characteristics 
and location of the houses in higher demand; (c) The supply response in the 
face of such new demand; and (d) The influence of the program on price-
setting behavior and competition in the real estate market. 
In regard to the first factor, although both subsidies create additional 
demand, only the downpayment subsidy does that directly, by providing the 
household with fresh money to complete the transaction. The interest rate 
subsidy helps the household in a more indirect fashion, by making it more 
likely to successfully apply for a loan. That being said, it should be kept in 
mind that the flow of new demand infused into the market is normally well 
above total subsidy outlays.4 As reflected in equation (9) for the 
downpayment subsidy, the government takes upon itself just a fraction ds of 
total house value V0, with the remaining part being covered by the buyer 
and the creditor.5  
As for the second factor on the list, it is important to recall that the 
additional demand will not spread uniformly across all available units in the 
market, but it will rather concentrate on those segments that are targeted by 
the program. Building on previous discussion in the paper, governments 
seek to support lower income families, which as a rule tend to look for 
equally lower value housing located in less expensive neighborhoods, and 
this is the market most likely to experience price inflation. Since this 
targeting is clearer under a downpayment vis-à-vis an interest rate subsidy, 
this effect will be more pronounced in the first case.  
An obvious argument to be considered, and one largely independent of 
the subsidy design to be adopted, is the responsiveness of supply to a larger 
                                                          
3 Razmilic Burgos (2010) discusses and unveils some evidence on this front for Chile. 
4 On the other hand, subsidy expenses may overestimate the net effect of the subsidy whenever 
some beneficiaries that were planning on purchasing the house without government assistance 
now enroll in the program. The pure effect consists of the houses being bought only by virtue of 
the subsidy. 
5 Also those equations are written for one representative loan, not for the whole number of 
subsidies provided, which is the relevant figure to measure total additional demand. 
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demand. In general, this reaction will be stronger in the long- than in the short-
term, and will as well depend on other variables, including the availability of 
land and financing for construction projects, the building regulations at the 
municipal level, and the perception within the construction industry about the 
government commitment toward the subsidy program as a long-term policy or 
a temporary fix. 
The subsidy scheme may not be innocuous either for the degree of 
competition in the real estate market. In particular, the buyer pays the full price 
price under an interest rate subsidy but only a share of it under a downpayment 
subsidy.6 This may lead the household to overpay for a given property, as a 
result of a less active search or less aggressive price negotiation, or to look for 
a more expensive unit than without the subsidy. This distortion will amplify 
with the generosity of the subsidy (i.e., higher ds).  
To close, it must be noted that not only subsidies affect housing prices, but 
developments in the latter may have some influence on the program outcomes. 
For one, sustained housing price inflation will create a negative externality on 
households entering the market in the future by making units less affordable 
for subsidy beneficiaries and even more so for non-beneficiaries. Secondly, on 
a more positive note, higher housing prices in the future strengthen the 
willingness to repay, by making the default strategy more costly, as clear from 
the role of V1 in equation (8). 
 
V. Conclusions and Policy Lessons 
 
This work has investigated, to our best knowledge for the best time, the 
relative merits and pitfalls of downpayment and interest rate subsidies on the 
access to and the stability of the mortgage market, as well as their 
repercussions on the functioning of the real estate market. 
The main conclusions from the analysis are: 
(a) By improving the ability and willingness to repay, both subsidies 
enhance the probability of being eligible for a mortgage; 
(b) Under fiscal neutrality, both subsidies have the same effect on the 
ability and willingness to repay; 
                                                          
6 As a matter of fact, a lower price will benefit the buyer also under an interest rate subsidy by 
diminishing future interest and principal payments, and with fiscal neutrality both subsidies 
should be equivalent on this front as well. However, unlike the interest rate subsidy, the 
downpayment subsidy may be viewed as an upfront discount by some myopic households.  
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(c) In practice, for fiscal neutrality to hold, it would be necessary the 
percentage interest rate subsidy to be much larger than the downpayment 
subsidy, which is rare to happen; 
(d) When it comes to the willingness to repay, the interest rate subsidy 
may  however be superior in the case that the latter might induce 
borrowers to substitute downpayment of their own for subsidized 
downpayment; 
(e) The interest rate subsidy raises the loan size a bank is willing to 
grant, but the downpayment subsidy does not, the reason being that the 
latter actually diminishes the need for bank financing for a given property 
value; 
(f) The higher loan size under an interest rate subsidy may help 
borrowers gain access to a larger value property, but at the same time gives 
rise to higher default risk, as the rising leverage and interest rate make 
borrowers more vulnerable to negative shocks; 
(g) When targeting lower income households, the downpayment 
subsidy is superior to the interest rate subsidy, as the former increases the 
loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, two key criteria for mortgage 
borrower eligibility; 
(h) Such progressivity comes at the cost of a higher probability of 
default, meaning that some trade-off between equity and financial stability 
may emerge; 
(i) Subsidies are likely to put upward pressure on housing prices. The 
downpayment subsidy has a direct effect (by injecting fiscal resources to 
cover part of the property price) and an indirect effect (by easing the access 
to the mortgage market). The interest rate subsidy only has the latter effect; 
(j)  The downpayment subsidy is more likely to have a stronger effect 
on low and medium value housing units; 
(k) Compared to the interest rate subsidy, the downpayment support 
promotes a less aggressive competition in the real estate market; and 
(l) Regardless of the subsidy type, housing price inflation will also be 
driven by the supply reaction and other factors. In turn, housing revaluation 
over time may have one positive side effect (enhanced willingness to repay) 
and a negative side effect (externality on future buyers, both within and 
outside the subsidy program). 
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